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1. Introduction 
 
 Banks perform an activity of financial intermediation that involves risk. One of the 
main risks that banks need to manage is the liquidity risk. Liquidity risk means the 
possibility that a bank could not meet its obligations to depositors and could not satisfy its 
costumer loan demand. If a bank faces a liquidity problem, he needs to solve it quickly and 
discretely. A liquidity problem of a single bank could spread to other credit institutions, 
causing bank runs; creating a serious problem of systemic risk in the banking sector. 
 The management of the liquidity risk as gained new interest with the financial crisis 
triggered by the US subprime mortgage credit meltdown. The problems faced by banks all 
over the world, and in particular in Europe following this crisis, like the run on the 
Northern Rock and the uncertainty and the lack of confidence between peers that lead to a 
shortage of liquidity in money markets, accompanied by high short-term market interest 
rates, contributed to a new focus on liquidity risk. Also, banking regulation may need to put 
more emphasis on banks’ liquidity, instead of been focused only on solvency. 
 The banks intermediation activity is characterized by the acceptance of short-term 
deposits (demand or term deposits) and the granting of medium and long term loans. They 
must be prepared to meet their withdrawals of deposits at any moment of time. In order to 
do so, banks hold two types of reserves: required reserves, imposed by the central bank; and 
excess reserves, demanded by precautionary reasons. Holding reserves entails an 
opportunity cost but it represents an insurance against liquidity risk. 
 In the Euro Area, and according to the Single Monetary Policy, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) requires the credit institutions to hold minimum reserves, according to 
an average provision. This minimum reserve system pursues two objectives: the 
stabilization of money market interest rates and the creation or enlargement of a structural 
liquidity shortage. The European credit institutions also demand excess reserves, as 
documented in Bindseil et al. (2004), in order to hold a buffer against deposit withdrawals 
and banking transfers. 
 The main objective of this work is to study the demand for excess reserves by the 
Euro Area banks, its determinants, and how it changed with the beginning and development 
of the credit crisis. Our study is focused on the period after the changes in the procedures of 
the Single Monetary Policy in March 2004 until the most recent data available. Thus, our 
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data spans over 18 months of data (August 2007 - December 2008) that covers the ongoing 
credit crisis.  
 This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature. 
Section 3 details the institutional features of the reserve system of the single monetary 
policy, allowing the comprehension of the framework in which European banks hold 
reserves. Section 4 describes the data and the behaviour of market variables and presents 
the results of estimation. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 5. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
 
 The demand for precautionary money balances has two fundamental determinants: 
the uncertainty that affects the economic agents and against which they represent a buffer1 
and, their opportunity cost. The models of reserve management by banks2 develop these 
two features of the demand for excess reserves by banks. These well-know models in the 
literature were presented by Orr and Mellon (1961), Poole (1971), Frost (1971) and 
Baltensperger (1974) and in the surveys of Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984). 
More recently, Allen (1998), Nautz (1998), Clouse and Dow Jr. (1999), Selgin (2001), 
Heller and Lengwiler (2003) and Bindseil et al. (2004) were new applications of these 
models3. 
 According to the reserve management models, the objective of the bank is to 
minimize the expected cost of holding reserves. In each reserve maintenance period, the 
bank needs to decide the amount of reserves to hold, given the uncertainty in the net cash 
drain the bank will face, and the penalty that he will suffer in case of illiquidity. Given 
these hypothesis, the optimality condition of the model implies that banks hold an amount 
of reserves in which the marginal cost of holding reserves is equal to the marginal reduction 
in expected liquidity costs. 
 Nautz (1998) presents an interesting extension of this model because it reinforces 
the idea of uncertainty in the demand for reserves. The model is developed in a framework 
of two periods of time; in the second period the bank seeks a refinancing in the repo 
market. In the beginning of the period 1, when the bank decides the quantity of reserves to 
                                                 
1 See Borio (1997). 
2 These are inventory models like the one of Baumol (1952) that analyses the individual demand of money for 
precautionary reasons. 
3 See Sol Murta (2006) for more details about these developments. 
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hold, the future repo rate and the amount of refinancing obtained by the bank in the auction 
are unknown. The objective of this model is to capture the role played by the current 
procedures of monetary policy, and to study the effects of the expected refinancing 
conditions in the demand for reserves. Nautz (1998) concludes that in an environment 
characterized by higher uncertainty in the monetary policy features, banks increase their 
reserves. This work also concludes that a flexible monetary policy increases the importance 
of expectations about the future path of monetary policy. 
 Although the theory of bank reserve management has reached a mature stage of 
development, the empirical study of the determinants of the demand for reserves is not 
frequent. Nautz (1998) studies the behaviour of the German money market interest rate, in a 
period before the 3rd Stage of EMU, and finds that the increase in the uncertainty about the 
Bundesbank refinancing conditions leads to the decrease of the money market rate. This is 
interpreted as the effect of a lower demand of borrowed reserves in the market due to 
higher reserves balances hold by banks. Bennett and Peristiani (2002) test empirically the 
hypothesis that American banks with binding reserve requirements manage their reserves 
different from other banks. They conclude, for the period 1994-1998, that banks without 
binding requirements manage their reserves more actively than other banks.  
 The aim of the work of Evanoff (1990) is to test empirically the model of the 
demand for reserves, using American commercial banks data, for the period 1975-1985. He 
estimates a linear relationship between the excess reserves of banks and its determinants. 
He concludes that excess reserves are a negative function of its opportunity cost and a 
positive function of 1) the penalty cost (of lack of liquidity), 2) the expected interest rate 
change and 3) the variance of reserves. 
 In this work we will analyze empirically the demand for excess reserves in the Euro 
Area, in the last years, with the objective of understanding its determinants. 
 
3. The demand for reserves in the Euro Area 
 
3. 1. The minimum reserve system of the Single Monetary Policy 
 
 The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability. In order to 
achieve its objectives, it has several instruments at its disposal: open market operations, 
standing facilities and reserve requirements. 
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 The Eurosystem requires credit institutions to hold minimum reserves, in a reserve 
account on its national central bank, with the aims of stabilizing interest rates and create (or 
enlarge) a structural liquidity shortage. The minimum reserves are calculated according to 
an average provision4, along a maintenance period of about one month. The coefficient of 
reserves is 2% of the reserve base and the system is lagged. The required reserves are 
remunerated at an average of the marginal rate of the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO). 
When credit institutions fail to comply with their reserve requirement, the ECB imposes 
one of several sanctions, applied to the amount the institution failed to provide: a payment 
up to 5 percentage points above the marginal lending rate; a payment of up the double the 
marginal lending rate applied to the same amount; or the constitution of a non-interest-
bearing deposit up to 3 times this amount. 
 The other instruments of the Single Monetary Policy are the open market operations 
and the standing facilities5. Open market facilities play an important role for the purposes of 
steering interest rates, managing the liquidity situation and signaling the stance of monetary 
policy. The most important ones are the MRO that are weekly liquidity-providing reverse 
transactions. Other open market operations are the Longer-Term refinancing operations 
(LTRO), the Fine Tuning Operations and the Structural Operations. 
 Finally, the ECB offers two standing facilities: the marginal lending facility at 
which banks can obtain overnight liquidity and the deposit facility at which banks can make 
overnight deposits. The two interest rates of the two facilities are determined by the ECB 
and represent, respectively, a ceiling and a floor to the overnight interest rate of the money 
market. 
 To obtain liquidity through refinancing operations or through the marginal lending 
facility, the credit institutions must possess eligible collateral. 
 The ECB always tried to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and the 
stabilization of interest rates: since July 2000 the MRO were carried out as minimum 
variable rate tenders (instead of fixed rate tenders) and, at the same time, the ECB began 
the publication of liquidity estimations. Also, in November 2001 the bank decided to assess 
its monetary policy only in the first Governing Council meeting of the month. Finally, in 
March 2004, the Eurosystem also modified some of the characteristics of its procedures:  
                                                 
4 See the details of the minimum reserve system in ECB (2008). 
5 The details of the open market operations and standing facilities are also in ECB (2008). 
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1)  The reserve maintenance period has since started always on the settlement day of 
the MRO following the Governing Council meeting at which the assessment of 
monetary policy is pre-scheduled. This change aimed to reduce the impact of 
interest rate expectations on bank’s bidding behaviour in the MRO, and to reduce 
the likelihood that the maintenance periods start and end on days when the 
TARGET6 is closed. 
2) The maturity of the MRO was shortened from 2 weeks to 1 week. 
 These two changes eliminated the expectations of interest rate changes in a 
particular reserve maintenance period, and contributed to the stabilization of the conditions 
in which banks bid for MRO funds.  
 
 In the last 4 years, from March 2004 to December 2008, the amount of minimum 
reserves in the Euro Area increased, as we can see in the figure 1. The figure shows a 
“jump” in the volume of minimum reserves, in the beginning of the year 2007, due to the 
accession of Slovenia to the Euro Area. According to the Annual Report of the ECB (2006), 
the entry of Slovenia in to the Euro Area increased the aggregate reserve requirements of 
Euro area credit institutions by 0,3 billions of Euros. 
 
Figure 1: The volume of minimum reserves in the Euro Area (millions of Euros) 
 
Source: ECB 
 
 
                                                 
6 TARGET- Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System is the real-
time gross settlement for the Euro and it is, since November 2007, on its second version. 
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3. 2. The demand for excess reserves in the Euro Area 
 
 The daily reserve holding of an institution is calculated as the end-of-day balance on 
its reserve account and the compliance with the minimum reserves is calculated according 
to an average provision along the maintenance period. Thus, in each maintenance day, a 
bank can hold an amount of reserves that is above or bellow the average minimum 
requirement. The amount that is above the minimum represents excess reserves. The banks 
follow a conservative strategy, holding excess reserves in the beginning of the maintenance 
period; or postpone the holding of the minimum volume of reserves to the end of 
maintenance periods, according with their expectations about withdrawals, interest rates7, 
etc. 
 The management of excess reserves is of crucial importance to banks. They are 
demanded due to the uncertainty that affects banking business, by precautionary reasons. 
However, holding excess reserves implies an opportunity cost. In the Euro Area they are 
not remunerated. Therefore, credit institutions must develop a flexible and frequently 
revised management of reserves, containing simply and clear daily rules with the aim of 
avoiding overdrafts and liquidity crisis8.  
 In the Euro Area credit institutions keep a low level of excess reserves, 
corresponding, on average, to 0,5% of minimum reserves. In 2004, the average volume of 
excess reserves floated around €0,6 billions, and reached an average amount of €0,8 
billions in 2005. In the year 2006 the average volume decreased by €0,1 billions relatively 
to the amount of 2005. In 2007 this level was €0,9 billions, which is around €0,15 billion 
above the average recorded since March 2004. Finally, in 2008 the excess reserves were, on 
average, €1 billion, the highest amount since March 2004. In spite of this increase in the 
volume, the importance of excess reserves continued stable around 0,5% of required 
reserves9. 
 In the reserve maintenance periods ending on 7 October and 11 November 2008, the 
amount of excess reserves reached, respectively, €2 billions and €2,4 billions, the highest 
                                                 
7 After the changes in the procedures of the Single Monetary Policy, in March 2004, the effectiveness of a 
new value of official interest rates coincides with the start of the maintenance period, which eliminates the 
expectations of a change in official rates inside a maintenance period. However, interest rates on money 
markets are not constant.  
8 This subject is detailed in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000). 
9 See the Annual Report of the Banco de Portugal, 2004, 2005 and 2006, and the Annual Report of 2007 of 
the ECB  and the Monthly Bulletin of the ECB, December 2008. 
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levels10 since March 2004. Since the beginning of the financial turmoil, in August 2007, the 
concerns about creditworthiness and the risk aversion of investors in general, and banks in 
particular increased. The possibility of the financial institutions suffering losses due to their 
exposure to subprime mortgages and other related instruments, originated an increase in 
uncertainty in money markets and other financial markets. As a result, the balances of 
liquid assets became larger and short-term interest rates increased11. Since the beginning of 
this credit crisis, the ECB augmented its supply of liquidity in the first part of the 
maintenance periods and reduced it at the end of reserve periods. These actions had the 
effects of: 1) maintaining the volumes of liquidity lending unchanged, and; 2) allowing the 
credit institutions to hold their required reserves sooner, at the beginning of maintenance 
reserve periods. 
However, after September 2008, with the failure of Lehman Brothers, the problems 
in AIG and in several European banks, the turbulence in financial markets and the lack of 
confidence in the financial institutions intensified. The ECB reinforced his liquidity supply 
and adopted further measures to ensure the existence of liquidity in interbank markets12: 
- in the MRO, it allots larger amounts in excess of the benchmark amount; 
- it decided to carry out the MRO and the LTRO through fixed rate tender 
procedures, and with full allotment; 
- the frequency of every month LTRO augmented to two 3-month operations, one 6-
month operation and one operation with the same length of the relevant maintenance period 
(until the end of March 2009); 
- the corridor formed by the interest rates of the standing facilities narrowed, from 
200 to 100 basis points (until the end of the first maintenance period of 2009). 
- the ECB extended the list of eligible collateral and enlarged its swap line with the 
Federal Reserve in order to increase the provision of US dollars. 
 
 The objective of this work is to study the demand for excess reserves in the Euro 
Area. We test empirically the model of reserve management presented in the literature, 
searching for the determinants of the demand for excess balances of the European banks.  
 
 
                                                 
10 These are average levels recorded at the end of the maintenance period. 
11 See the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, September 2007.  
12 See the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, December 2008. 
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4. Empirical Estimation 
 
4.1. Data 
 
 We study the period since the implementation of the changes in monetary policy 
procedures of March 2004, until the most recently available data (and covering complete 
reserve maintenance periods), that coincides with the end of the last reserve maintenance 
period of the year 2008. This allows the study of the determinants of the demand for excess 
reserves in a period of financial markets stability (from the beginning of the period until the 
financial turmoil of August 2007) and also in a period of credit crisis and turbulence 
(August 2007- December 2008) and to analyze the effects of the credit crisis in the demand 
for excess reserves in the Euro Area. The data were collected from the ECB’s site and from 
the Euribor’s site13.  
 The ECB publishes aggregate daily data on reserve requirements and current reserve 
account. Using the selected data, we calculated the difference between the current account 
and the reserve requirement, obtaining the daily volume of excess reserves, in € billions.  
 Figure 2 shows the daily series of excess reserves of Euro Area credit institutions. 
Since August 2007 the series is represented in a shadowed area, allowing us to note higher 
and lower (negative) volumes of reserves, that is, an increase in its volatility. The volatility 
of the series is associated with the turbulence in the money market due to the current credit 
crisis, triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis of the USA, in August 2007. 
 When the average level of reserves is lower than the requirement, the credit 
institution needs to obtain funds from the other banks or from the central bank. The 
occurrence of a reserve deficit implies having to obtain costly funds. We use the spread 
between the EURIBOR14 and the minimum rate of MRO as a proxy to the cost of funds. 
The use of a spread is usual in the literature because it is the deviation from an official rate 
that is relevant to the study of the cost of holding reserves. We calculated the spread from 
the EURIBOR - 1 week and EURIBOR-2 weeks1516. 
                                                 
13 The Euribor site (www.Euribor.org) contains historical data about the Euribor and the EONIA. 
14 The EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) is the rate at which euro interbank term deposits are offered 
by one prime bank to another prime bank. 
15 An alternative is to use the interest rate of the marginal lending facility. However, banks use this facility as 
a last resource, after using refinancing operations and money market, to obtain liquidity. 
16 The historical data on EURIBOR 1-week and 2-weeks doesn’t contain information about week-ends and 
holidays. Therefore, on these days, we use the value of the interest rate of the previous day. This is a usual 
procedure in the literature. 
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Figure 2: Excess reserves in the Euro Area (€ billions), March 2004- December 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ECB 
 
 Another determinant of the demand for excess reserves is the uncertainty about the 
liquidity needs of banks. At the aggregate level, the liquidity needs of the banking system 
arise from the minimum reserve requirements (that are known at the beginning of each 
maintenance period) and from the autonomous factors, the exogenous determinants of 
banking liquidity that are banknotes in circulation, government deposits and other 
autonomous factors. The ECB publishes (weekly) forecasts about autonomous liquidity 
factors17 and also the realized ex-post daily values of autonomous factors, in € billions. We 
calculated the difference between the actual ex-post values and the forecasts, obtaining the 
series of the forecast error. A positive (negative) forecast error means that the effective 
liquidity need of the banking sector is higher/lower than expected. Figure A.1 in the 
Appendix shows the series of the ECB forecasts error18, and table A.1 shows the statistics 
of this and other series. We can observe that the ECB produces good quality forecasts; the 
error is close to zero and, in the period studied, the forecast error was, in average, negative 
and equal to -0,44 € billions: the ex-post liquidity needs were lower than the ECB forecast. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Expressed as daily averages. 
18 The series presented some outliers, which we removed before the construction of the graphic. 
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4.2. Estimation  
 
 The aim of this work is to study the behaviour of banks in its demand for excess 
reserves.  
 The estimated equation is: 
+++++= ttttt endmonthrexweekaverrorspreadexcessres 54321 ααααα   
   ttt crisisendperiod εαα +++ 76  
where texcessres  represents the excess reserves, tspread  is the spread between the 
EURIBOR and the minimum rate of MRO and taverror  is the ECB’s error on the forecasts 
of the banking sector liquidity needs, defined as the average error of the two previous days. 
We use the average of the two previous days because banks react to the error with a delay. 
 We also include other variables in the estimation. The demand for excess reserves 
balances depends on the excess reserves of the previous days, that we represent 
by trexweek , equal to the average daily volume of the previous week
19. Doing this, we are 
supposing that the banks follow a constant balances strategy; a high (low) volume of 
reserves is balanced by a low (high) volume on the following days. 
 The variable tendmonth  is a dummy that captures the end of month effect on 
reserves. It takes value 1 on the last day of each month and value 0 on the other days. The 
reference to the end of month effect in interest rate spreads or interest rate volatility is usual 
in the literature and explained by the occurrence of payments activities and equity 
restrictions of banks20. 
 The variable tendperiod  is a dummy variable introduced to take into account the 
effect of the end of reserve maintenance period. In the last days of maintenance periods the 
volume of excess reserves held by banks is higher, as Bindseil et al. (2004) note. The 
authors explain this increase above trend by the fact that many banks fulfill their reserve 
requirements in the beginning of the maintenance period and accumulate excess reserves to 
prevent against liquidity shocks. The variable tendperiod  is equal to 1 in the days since the 
last MRO of each reserve maintenance period until the end of the period. It allows us to 
                                                 
19 Every 7 days of each week, this variable is equal to the average level of excess reserves of the previously 
week. 
20 See, among others, Bindseil et al. (2003). 
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analyze the behaviour of the banking system after the last operation that provides liquidity 
to the system. 
 Finally, we introduce the dummy variable tcrisis , which takes value 1 after 9 
August 2007 and 0 before. The figure 2 shows an increase in the volatility of the demand of 
excess reserves after the beginning of the financial crisis. In this period the interbank 
markets suffered a contraction in its activity. Therefore, the variable tcrisis  is introduced in 
order to study the impact of the credit crisis on the demand for excess reserves in the Euro 
Zone. 
 We performed the Hausman’s test with the aim to test the hypothesis of endogeneity 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables21. The results obtained didn’t 
allow us to exclude the presence of endogeneity between the dependent variable and the 
spread. Therefore, the model was estimated by the method of the instrumental variables22.  
 We also performed tests that did not allow us to reject the presence of autocorrelation of 
the errors and heteroskedasticity. The problem of autocorrelation was solved by the 
introduction of the lagged depend variable and the problem of heteroskedasticity by the 
procedure robusterrors of the econometrics program23. All the series were submitted to 
ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) tests that allow us to accept that the series were 
stationary. 
 
 
4.3. Results 
 
 In all the estimations performed, using the formulation of the previous equation, or 
other similar formulations, we obtained non significant coefficients in two variables: the 
forecast error ( taverror ) and the dummy of the crisis ( tcrisis ). Therefore, we estimated the 
equation without these two variables. The results obtained, using the spread of the Euribor–
1 week in the estimation can be observed in table 1.  
 
                                                 
21 The estimations were realized with the program WinRATS 6.2. 
22 The instrumental variables chosen were: spread, spread{1}, rexweek, endperiod, endmonth, crisis, 
excessres{1}. 
23 The procedure robusterrors computes a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix allowing for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 1: Results of the model estimation on the demand for excess reserves 
Period studied: 10/4/2004 – 9/12/2008 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
t-stat Significance 
constant -0.26113814   0.78905880     -0.33095 0.74068308 
spread 15.0573916   7.60928199    1.97882   0.047836939 
rexweek -0.22645863   0.05310956    -4.26399 0.00002008 
endperiod -5.38335951    0.91263406     -5.89871    0.00000000 
endmonth -4.58526510 1.90534309     -2.40653 0.01610489 
excessres{1} 0.64361772  0.05081678     12.6654 0.00000000 
Number 
observations: 1735 
Degrees of freedom: 
1729 
   
 
 The results allow us to conclude that the demand for excess reserves in the Euro 
Area changes in the same direction than the Euribor spread. When the spread increases, a 
situation of lack of liquidity implies a higher cost of obtaining reserves, which can not be 
avoid. Thus, banks hold a higher volume of excess reserves to prevent these situations.  
 If we use the spread of the Euribor–2 weeks the coefficient obtained is similar, but 
the spread is not significant24. This result is expected since that, after the introduction of the 
changes to monetary policy procedures, the maturity of the MRO is 1 week. 
 The coefficient estimated on the variable rexweek  is negative which is explained by 
the average condition of the minimum reserve system. Banks balance their end of day 
volumes of reserves, in order to meet their requirements. Therefore, they demand more 
(less) excess reserves when the average value of past reserves is lower (higher). 
 The positive coefficient of the variable lagged excess reserves does not counter the 
average condition, that is valid along the maintenance period, and which we find that works 
from a week to the following one. The positive, and lower than one, sign of the variable 
excessres{1} only means that there is some inertia in the demand for reserves, and banks 
can not change their amounts of reserves overnight. 
 The calendar variable related to the end of month presents an estimated negative 
coefficient, as expected. The ECB aims to avoid disruptions on the end of month 
                                                 
24 The results obtained with the spread of the Euribor – 2 weeks are not presented here since they are similar 
to the ones of the table 1. They are available upon request. 
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compliance of liquidity obligations, and supplies a higher amount of reserves. The banks 
use it to meet their business needs and hold less excess reserves. 
 The estimated effect end of reserve maintenance period is negative which means 
that, on these days, banks continue to hold minimum reserves and the volume of excess 
reserves is lower. After the changes in the Single Monetary Policy procedures, the 
compliance with minimum reserves is regular along the maintenance periods. Bindseil et al. 
(2004) say that excess reserves increase slightly at the end of reserve periods. However, 
they study a period of time earlier than those changes. In the Appendix 1, figure A.2 we see 
some peaks in the spread, at the end of maintenance periods that point to unbalanced 
liquidity situations. According with the ECB, the changes in monetary policy procedures 
contribute to a higher probability of liquidity imbalances after the allotment of the last 
MRO of each maintenance period. In the new framework, the allotment of the last MRO 
takes place 8 days before the end of the period25, and it is also more difficult to forecast the 
autonomous factors. Thus, the volatility of the overnight interest rate is higher. The ECB 
decided to publish the MRO benchmark allotment 26 and the forecast about the autonomous 
factors in the day of the announcement of the MRO and also in the day of the allotment, 
making explicitly clear to the market the existence of liquidity imbalances after the last 
MRO of the period27. 
 
 Finally, it is important to put forward an explanation to the fact that we do not found 
significance on the variables forecast error and financial crisis.  
 The ECB offers liquidity to the banking sector, according with his forecasts of the 
autonomous factors, promoting adequate liquidity conditions. The estimated coefficients on 
the variable average forecast error are always non significant. In fact, it is recognized the 
good quality of ECB liquidity forecasts and also its improvement along the last 6 years28. 
This measure of uncertainty is not a determinant in the demand for excess reserves because 
banks keep confidence in ECB’s liquidity forecasts. 
 Finally, the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable crisis, that introduces the 
effect of the credit crisis triggered by the deteriorating US subprime mortgage loans, is also 
                                                 
25 Before the changes in monetary policy procedures, the timing of the last MRO varied from 2 and 8 days 
before the end of the reserve maintenance period. 
26 The benchmark allotment of a MRO is the amount required to establish balanced liquidity conditions. 
27 See the ECB’s Annual Report, 2004 and the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, February 2005. 
28 In earlier (and non-published) versions of this work, using a short period of time (also beginning in March 
2004 but ending about one year earlier) we found a positive and significant coefficient on this variable. This 
supports the idea of the improvement of the quality of ECB forecasts. 
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non significant. The environment of uncertainty is not significant in the demand for excess 
reserves. Trying to test for the robustness of this result, we used different specifications for 
the variable crisis, focusing on the volatility of interest rate (using the squared spread of the 
Euribor-1 week as a proxy for the volatility of money market) and focusing on the volatility 
of returns of the European stock market (using the squared return of the Index Euronext 100 
as a proxy for the volatility of financial markets). Banks perform financial activities in the 
stock markets, which affect their return; their own stocks are quoted in the market; 
therefore, the volatility of the returns on the European stock market describes the 
environment of uncertainty that affects banking activities. 
The results obtained, and described in Appendix 2, confirm that the estimated 
coefficients are very stable and that the credit crisis is not determinant in the bank’s demand 
for excess reserves. 
 In fact, during this period, the ECB achieved the control over the market tensions, 
using several measures, especially in the pikes of the crisis. The ECB offered higher 
refinancing volumes in the beginning of the maintenance periods (and lowered it in the end 
of the period) and adopted further measures to ensure the existence of liquidity in interbank 
markets (referred in section 3.2). 
 The figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix show the behaviour of excess reserves 
along the reserve maintenance periods, before and after the subprime crisis. The pattern 
observed is different in the two figures: in the period after August 2007 the excess reserves 
are higher in the beginning of the periods and then decrease until the end. This pattern 
shows that the banks hold minimum reserves sooner, in each reserve maintenance period 
(with the support of ECB, which supply the reserves in the MRO). 
 
Concluding, we find that the spread is the most important determinant of the 
demand for excess reserves by banks. Thus, the credit institutions must observe and 
understand the behaviour of this variable in order to achieve a better reserve management. 
The ECB plays an important role: offering liquidity along the maintenance periods, 
forecasting (and publishing) the banking sector liquidity needs, reducing the uncertainty in 
period of crisis; thus, contributing to minimize the uncertainty and to an efficient reserve 
management. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
 In its business activity, credit institutions face several risks. One of them is the 
liquidity risk; banks need to hold liquid assets in order to manage this risk and to avoid that 
contagion effects spread to the other banks. 
 The aim of this work is to analyze the demand for precautionary reserves in the 
Euro Area, its determinants and to test for its changes after the beginning of the current 
credit crisis. 
 The literature reviewed identifies the opportunity costs and the probability of being 
in a situation of lack of liquidity, which is due to the uncertainty of net payments of banks, 
as the main determinants of the demand for precautionary reserves. 
 We studied the period since March 2004, when ECB introduced some changes in its 
operating procedures, until the most recent available data that covers 17 months of the 
current credit crisis. We tested an empirical model of bank’s behaviour in the demand for 
excess reserves. We concluded that there is a positive relationship between the demand for 
reserves and its financing cost, due to the need to avoid illiquidity situations. There is also 
evidence that the demand for excess reserves does not react to the ECB’s liquidity forecast 
error. The inertia in the demand for reserves is explained by the high quality of the ECB’s 
forecasts and its improvement over the time. We also found calendar effects in the demand 
for excess reserves like the end of the month and the last days of the reserve maintenance 
periods (after the settlement of the last MRO of the period). We found evidence that, in the 
end of maintenance period, the banks are still holding minimum reserves, and excess 
reserves are lower than in the previous parts of the period. This effect is different from 
previous literature findings, which we relate with the period studied: after the changes in 
the Single Monetary Policy procedures. 
 We didn’t find evidence of changes in the demand for excess reserves by European 
banks after of the beginning of the subprime credit crisis. The ECB, trough the 
implementation of several measures, softened the crisis in the money markets. 
 This study contributed to the understanding that, in a banking sector where the 
central bank contributes to minimize the impact of a crisis that affects the balance sheet of 
banks, and contributes actively to reduce uncertainty, the credit institutions must focus on 
the cost of obtaining reserves, in order to minimize it. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure A.1: Forecast error of the ECB on the autonomous liquidity factors 
Time span: 10/4/2004 - 9/12/2008 
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Source: ECB 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Statistics of the series,  
Time span: 10/4/2004 - 9/12/2008 
Number of observations: 1736 
 
Variable Mean Standard-
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Excess reserves 0.819686 16.826913 -69.2350 168.827000
Forecast error -0.410534 6.6622807 -37.1260 61.289000
Spread Euribor 1week 0.130864 0.140915 -0.694000 0.1269000
Spread Euribor 2weeks 0.151352 0.150155 0.574000 0.1285000
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Figure A.2: Spread between the Euribor 1 week and minimum interest rate of the MRO 
Time span: 10/4/2004 - 9/12/2008 
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Source: ECB and Euribor site 
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Figure A.3.: The demand for excess reserves before the subprime crisis 
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Figure A.4.: The demand for excess reserves after the subprime crisis 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A.2.1: Results of the model estimation on the demand for excess reserves 
using the square of Euribor spread as a proxy for the volatility of the market in the period of 
the credit crisis 
Period studied: 10/4/2004 – 9/12/2008 
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation t-stat Significance 
constant -0.59902136   0.7005600       -0.85568 0.39217661 
spread 18.2311199   6.76315012     2.69566   0.00070250 
rexweek -0.23043223   0.05301182     -4.34681 0.00001381 
endperiod -5.31740161    0.92400954      -5.75470    0.00000001 
endmonth -4.51332620 1.92363654      -2.34625 0.01896354 
D(squaredspread) -5.29210208    3.21806759      -1.64450    0.10007361 
excessres{1} 0.64317081  0.05064241       12.70003 0.00000000 
Number observations: 
1735 
Degrees of freedom: 
1729 
   
The estimated equation is: 
+++++= ttttt endmonthendperiodrexweekspreadexcessres 54321 ααααα   
  ttt adsquarespreD εα ++ )(6  
where tD  is equal to zero in the period before the credit crisis and tD  is equal to one in the period 
after the credit crisis. The variable tadsquarespre  is equal to the squared spread of the Euribor-1 
week. 
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Table A.2.2: Results of the model estimation on the demand for excess reserves 
using the squared return of the Index Euronext 100 as a proxy for the volatility of the 
financial markets in the period of the credit crisis 
Period studied: 10/4/2004 – 9/12/2008 
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation t-stat Significance 
constant -0.27052218  0.78777329      -0.34340 0.73129676 
spread 15.16349092  7.58305812     1.99965   0.04553766 
rexweek -0.22638397  0.05317810     -4.25709 0.00002071 
endperiod -5.37675838   0.91484246      -5.87725    0.00000000 
endmonth -4.58583708 1.90414041      -2.40835 0.01602480 
D( nextsquareEuro ) -80.43301182   83.04095897      -0.96859    0.33274757 
excessres{1} 0.64381556  0.05082770       12.66663 0.00000000 
Number observations: 
1735 
Degrees of 
freedom: 1729 
   
The estimated equation is: 
tttttttt nextsquareEuroDendmonthendperiodrexweekspreadexcessres εαααααα ++++++= )(654321
where tD  is equal to zero in the period before the credit crisis and tD  is equal to one in the period 
after the credit crisis. The variable tnextsquareEuro  is equal to the squared changes of the Index 
Euronext 100 (source: Euronext site). 
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